UKRAINE HAS A LOT TO ACCOMPLISH FOR SUCCESFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ASSOCIATION AGREEEMENT

Fragmenty wypowiedzi dla czasopisma: "NATIONAL SECURITY & DEFENCE", numer 1-2 (181-182), Kijów 2020, UKRAINIAN CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC&POLITICAL STUDIES named after Olexandr Razumkov.

 

 

Jacek KLUCZKOWSKI, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Poland to Ukraine (2005-2010)

     – Which factors impede Ukraine’s integration into the EU?

     - Talking about factors impeding integration processes, we should be looking everywhere – on the Ukrainian side, on the EU’s side and in the bilateral relations of individual EU countries with Ukraine. Some of them are structural and long-term, hard to overcomeat once. Others require more consistency and initiative from politicians and diplomats. First, we need to clarify what these words really mean today: “Ukraine's integration into the EU”. 

     I believe, it is necessary to look at Kyiv’s political intentions, its goal of achieving EU membership in the near future. This goal was even captured in the Ukrainian Constitution. that the EU’s real policy and that of its key member states does not include a prospect of Ukraine’s membership or even candidacy at the moment. Of course, this does not mean it will stay like this forever. (...)

     Of course, both for Ukraine and Poland it would be better if we could talk about the prospect of Ukraine’s full membership in the EU today. However, keeping to the realistic perception of the situation, we should not focus on achieving this goal in the near future. I even think that this would be counterproductive.

     So, when we talk about Ukraine’s European integration today, we have to remember what is real, and what remains wishful thinking until distant future. The primary thing that is real today is successful implementation of the Association Agreement and the Free Trade Agreement, as well as the Eastern Partnership programme. There is a lot to do here, foremost, for the Ukrainian side.

     In 2020 and the following years, Ukraine’s European integration means successful and timely accomplishment of association tasks. (...)

     Currently it is hard to say, when a “window of opportunity” will open for Ukraine, and when it will be able to receive the candidate status. This could possibly happen during the future EU Council Presidency of Poland and Lithuania – in 2025 and 2027, respectively. But this will require a major acceleration on the part of Ukraine in implementing its Association agenda, so that in 2024 parties could ascertain the completion of most tasks jointly scheduled in the Association Agreement. (...)

     – How does the Russian factor impact Ukraine's European integration? What are the forms and instruments of this impact?

     - Russia is fighting all efforts aimed at building closer ties between Ukraine and the West. In the past, Kremlin has stated on numerous occasions that it only cares about Ukraine’s NATO membership prospects, there was no mention of any serious admonishments against Ukraine’s contacts with the EU on the part of Russia. However, in 2013 it turned out that prospects of Ukraine’s association with the EU enraged Moscow, which led to military aggression against its neighbour.
     Today, in the situation, when Ukraine’s European integration essentially means implementation of the Association agenda, trade agreement and support for internal reforms, Russia has limited possibilities of obstructing such EU-Ukraine cooperation. Because no one in the EU is seriously considering any further steps in EU-Ukraine integration, Russia will not have to counter this so-called “threat” to its national interests. 

     Besides, on their part, Russians are now trying to restore economic relations with Western Europe and consequentlyabstain from bringing any more tensions in relations with most EU countries. The situation may change, if new initiatives regarding Ukraine’s new status of relations with the EU appear on the agenda. But as mentioned before, we can hardly expect this to happen in the next few years.
     Of course, there is still propaganda as an instrument of Russian aggression – merciless and cynical, affecting Ukraine, and public opinion in Western countries. “Moscow’s hand” could be detected in the Dutch referendum, which almost blocked the ratification of Ukraine’s association with the EU. It can also be seen in discussions on the situation of national minorities in Ukraine and the issue of state language. The same can be said about Russia’s political activity in Western Balkans, which is aimed not so much at blocking European integration for Macedonia or Bosnia, but foremost – for Ukraine.
     By annexing Crimea and occupying a part of Donbas, Russia openly positioned itself as the country that does not respect Ukraine as an independent state and is not willing to achieve good neighbourhood relations with it. On the other hand, Russian model of integration in the post-Soviet space is not attractive for Ukrainians. Besides, at the moment, Moscow does not offer a single positive idea to ensure former USSR countries’ support,apart from referencing the Soviet myth and exerting merciless economic and political pressure on partners. It is hard to find any constructive elements here. (...)

     I have no doubt that Russia can and will be obstructing Ukraine’s further cooperation with the EU after the start of reintegration of the part of Donbas currently occupied by Russian mercenaries. If this reintegration does happen – it will be used by Kremlin to block Ukraine’s economic cooperation with the EU. The territories of the so-called “people’s republics” were essentially included in Russia’s economic space, and Ukrainian property was pillaged.