THE ORANGE REVOLUTION IN UKRAINE - THE CHARACTER AND STRUCTURE OF FOREIGN MEDIATOR ACTIVITIES (fragments - Introduction & Conclusion & Table of Contents)

I. Introduction

Much has already been written about the events in Ukraine in November and December 2004, which have gone down in history under the name of the Orange Revolution. The most important participants of these events gave extensive interviews or wrote memoirs. The topic has also been taken up by political scientists and historians. However, you can still get the impression that we only know part of a larger whole.

The success of the Orange Revolution is rightly attributed to the mobilization of civil society in Ukraine. As far as foreign actors are concerned, in the literature the role of the international observer mission is most appreciated in the elections. Also emphasized, but overestimated is the role of declarations of presidents, prime ministers, ministers and international institutions and organizations.

As a consequence, a certain one-sidedness of the description was created, where there is little space for certain aspects of events, such as the course of internal political processes in Ukraine, the attitude of neighboring countries, and last but not least, the role of mediators, whose role is still not, in my opinion, either adequately described or properly appreciated. It should be noted that the discussions during the plenary meetings of the Ukrainian "round table" have been described quite thoroughly^[1]. However, mediation was not limited to public meetings. Not all factors that ensured their success were identified in sufficient detail.

           The subject of this article is to fill this gap by reconstructing and interpreting the course and structure of the negotiation process with the participation of mediators.

Read more in this book: Three Revolutions: Mobilization and Change in Contemporary Ukraine

My main goal was to draw attention to the fact that in the events that went down in history under the name of the Orange Revolution, apart from its political and social dimensions, there was also an autonomous dynamic to the negotiation process. It is also worth noting how the circumstances and conditions of mediation changed.

Not much, for example, has been written about talks "in the back room" of public meetings and their impact on the evolution of the positions of the main participants in the process. Mediators played an important role in solving many political or legal-constitutional dilemmas that emerged during the negotiations. Additional information is also required on the relations between the mediation "triumvirate" Solana - Kwaśniewski - Adamkus with Brussels, The Hague (the Dutch presidency of the EU) as well as Washington and Moscow.

A deeper analysis would also be required of the preparation of subsequent plenary meetings of the Round Table. In particular, a description of the contacts of mediators with representatives of various political and business circles in Ukraine, which were used to identify the conditions for their neutralization, support of the negotiation process or participation in talks.

In my opinion, particularly needed is a closer look at the role of Poland, which in itself decided to initiate and conduct mediation, of which the Polish president held its undisputed leadership.

       I did not have the ambition to answer all questions regarding the course of international mediation during the Orange Revolution. With many responses, we still have to wait for the emergence of new sources in public circulation, still protected in various state services and archives, and inaccessible to historians. During the preparation of this study, I used literature, my own collections, conversations with many actors of events and the personal experience of a participant in the negotiations^[2].

 

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II. Conclusion 

The text deals with some selected issues related to the course of international mediation in Ukraine in November and December 2004. It was my intention to recall matters that had been neglected to date.

In autumn 2004, the West was not ready for the Ukrainian revolution. The reason that prompted the leaders of the Ukrainian opposition to invite the Polish president as a mediator was the obvious ineffectiveness of Western declarative diplomacy and the lack of willingness on the part of the most important states and Western structures to take such actions that could force officials in Kiev and Moscow to withdraw from electoral falsification.

The mediators skillfully used the invitation from the Ukrainian president to create a legal basis for their actions and then, and reasonably during the mediation mission, they gained international support for it by creating a kind of ad hoc coalition including representatives of the Council of Europe, the OSCE and the European Union. The Polish president and then the entire "mediating triumvirate" also received signals of trust and discreet support from Washington.

Mediation succeeded in gaining allies not so much for specific solutions as for the method of resolving a dispute through dialogue and mutual concessions. The key was to prevent the use of force, honestly verify the results of the vote and seek international protection for mediation and prepare appropriate conditions for dialogue and conducting such proceedings.

They also managed, despite perhaps a bit of a late start, to win the race against time and to anticipate or neutralize attempts to counteract the achievement of a peaceful solution by the autocratic regime and its Moscow protectors. The presence of mediators added to the faith of the opposition and protesters and, like a catalyst, accelerated internal political processes in Ukraine. The coherence between the mediators and the democratic opposition was particularly important. 

The agreement concept promoted by the mediators was also fostered by the repetition of the second round of the presidential election with the decentralization of power, i.e. the constitutional reform and the project to strengthen local government, which with all its imperfections contributed positively to the internal political processes in Ukraine and favored the alleviation of tension.

Contacts with representatives of various political and business circles also proved successful and helped in the course of negotiations. The noticeable synchronization of the activities of mediators with the activities of the parliament of Ukraine favored the independence of many state institutions, including, for example, the Supreme Court and media.

Also, some of the camp's power politicians were afraid of the possible effects of the very likely confrontation of the power structures on the protesters in the Maidan crowd and were interested in the peaceful, compromising solution adopted with the participation of the foreign politicians known to them.

The camp of Kuchma and Yanukovych did not turn out to be uniform. The arrival of foreign negotiators played the role of a catalyst and accelerated its decomposition. The mediators identified and skillfully used the divisions among the representatives of the Ukrainian authorities, which enabled some of the government camp politicians and military and service commanders to oppose irresponsible plans and orders and block their implementation.

A special role in the implementation of mediation was carried out by Poland, which was the first to take the initiative. Aleksander Kwaśniewski, in agreement with the Lithuanian president, undertook the risk of conducting post-election mediation in Ukraine. He was also guided by Polish national interest, because Warsaw did not want to agree to the potential risk of long-term destabilization in Ukraine, or possible subordination to the Kremlin, or finally to western sanctions.

During the turn of events in Kiev of the autumn and winter of 2004, Polish politicians convinced their European colleagues and partners that the attitude of Europe to Russia must consider neo-imperial behavior in its policy and should not grant it any special rights to Ukraine and other post-Soviet countries. Although not always and not everywhere - the Polish, Lithuanian and, more broadly, Central European point of view began to be noticed, as the events unfolded, but also were shared by more and more EU politicians and diplomats.

Poles probably had the best expertise at that time of the internal situation in Ukraine, they knew many Ukrainian politicians and oligarchs well, understood the relations between them, and also had language competences to allow them unrestricted contact with the Ukrainians. The Polish president de facto led the international mediation without waiting for recommendations or suggestions from outside, and Polish diplomats and experts were often and in many cases guides and translators for theirs Western colleagues.

In conclusion - the activities of foreign mediators during the Orange Revolution must be regarded as a successful example of support from the international community for a country trying to protect the democratic nature of the elections. An example that is not easy to repeat at another time (e. g. in 2014, during the Revolution of Dignity, the attempt of international mediation was totally unsuccessful.) From the perspective of the past 14 years, we can see how important the contribution of international mediation was in reaching the final agreement, which unlike some other post-election revolutions brought success to a candidate supported by the democratic opposition without using force or bloodshed.

Of course, the success of the Orange Revolution was not an ideal and textbook victory for democracy. It was rather forced by crowds on the streets the limited agreement of Ukrainian elites. About the weaknesses of them we know even more in 2018 than in 2004. After the Orange Revolution Ukraine did not carry out necessary reforms, it did not break free from the oligarchs’ dominance or its economic dependence on Russia.

However, it should be appreciated that thanks to this success, Ukraine regained freedom of political elections, maintained unity and gained a chance for reform. In 2005, the EU-Ukraine Action Plan was signed under the European Neighborhood Policy. In 2009 Ukraine joined the WTO and started talks about association and free trade with European communities.

But the signing of the Association Agreement with the EU took place only in 2014, after the next revolution in the Maidan and was paid for in blood. The Kremlin, fearing the Ukrainian example of the struggle for freedom of choice and democracy would prove contagious, used all its strength to try and prevent the independent and democratic development of Ukraine, moving to armed aggression, annexation of Crimea and occupation of Ukrainian territories in the east of the country.

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[1] Among many publications on this topic, you need to mention, among others: A collection of articles edited by A. Aslund and M. McFaul (eds) Revolution in Orange? The Origins of Ukraine's Democratic Breakthrough. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 2009); Steven Pifer, European Mediators and Ukraine's Orange Revolution, Problems of Post-Communism, November / December 2007; Donnacha Ó Beachá and Abel Polese. From roses to bullets: the rise and decline of post-Soviet color revolutions; T. A. Olszański, Wybory prezydenckie na Ukrainie: pażdziernik–grudzień 2004, OSW Studies 21, October 2005

[2] The author of the article was the head of the Polish working group preparing international mediation in Ukraine in November and December 2004 and then in 2005-2010 he was the Polish ambassador in Kiev. He had the opportunity to talk directly about the course of mediation with its main participants.

 

 

III. Table of Contents
 

Acknowledgements .......................................................................... 9
Foreword .......................................................................................... 13
Paweł Kowal, Georges Mink
The Long-lasting Revolution in Ukraine. Challenges
Related to Researching the Phenomenon ............................. 19
PART I REVOLUTION, CHANGE AND CONTINUATION
Mykola Riabchuk
Ukrainian Identity after Three Revolutions and One
(Unfinished) War ..................................................................... 61
Taras Kuzio
Three Revolutions, One War and Ukraine’s West Moves
East ............................................................................................ 91
Andrew Wilson
The Other Side of Revolution: Ukrainian Protest
Against Hybrid Regimes ...................................................... 121
Adam Balcer
The Great Steppe, the Cossacks, and the Revolution
of Dignity: A Historical and Cultural Anthropology of
Maidan .................................................................................... 133
Marcel H. Van Herpen
Ukraine’s Three Revolutions A Sign of Hope in a
Depressed World ................................................................... 159
PART II FROM REVOLUTION ON GRANITE TO ORANGE
REVOLUTION
Olga Onuch
The Forgotten Revolution on Granite (1990). A Legacy
of Contention in Independent Ukraine .............................. 177
Paulina Codogni
The 1990 Revolution on Granite as an Example of a
Nonviolent Revolution ......................................................... 195
Jacek Kluczkowski
The Orange Revolution in Ukraine. The Character and
Structure of Foreign Mediator Activities ............................ 225
Kataryna Wolczuk
The Revolutions and Ukraine’s European Integration...... 277
Igor Gretskiy
Russian Intervention in the Ukrainian Presidential
Elections of 2004..................................................................... 297
Tomasz Stępniewski
Strategy of the Russian Federation Regarding Ukraine
during the Orange Revolution ............................................. 333
Andrzej Szeptycki
Polish Knowledge Regarding the Transformation in
Ukraine. A case study ............................................................ 359
PART III FROM THE ORANGE REVOLUTION TO THE 2013-
2014 REVOLUTION
Ola Hnatiuk
Dreams of Europe. The Role of Intellectuals in Shaping
the European Orientation of Ukraine (2004—2014) ........... 403
Nataliia Pohorila, Andriу Bova
National Identity, Values and the Two Maidans:
What has Changed? A Comparative Perspective of the
2004 and 2013 Protests ........................................................... 439
Maciej Olchawa
Showdown with Yanukovych. The Role of the Cox-
Kwaśniewski Special Envoy Mission in Securing
Ukraine’s European Path ...................................................... 471
Taras Vozniak
Ukraine—An Uncompleted Revolution. An Attempt of
Interpreting the Revolutionary Situation of 2013-2014 ..... 489
Hryhorii Perepelytsia
The Outcomes of the Three Revolutions in Ukraine: A
Comparative Perspective ...................................................... 505
PART IV REVOLUTION, RELIGION AND MEMORY
Myroslav Marynovych
Religious Aspects of the Three Ukrainian Revolutions .... 555
Mychajlo Dymyd
The Values of the Maidan and Secularized Europe .......... 569
Katarina Novikova
Religion and National Ideas During the Euromaidan ...... 601
Oleksandr Hrytsenko
An Analysis of Ukrainian Decommunization
of 2015–2018 ............................................................................ 619
Jennifer L. Smith
Activism or Conditionality? Validating the New
Influence of Ukrainian Civil Society .................................. 677
Bibliography .................................................................................. 719